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Abstract
The international protection of democracy is a matter of power. 
Although recent studies systematized the multidimensional 
perspective of power in democracy protection policies, they focused 
on national states. This article focused on another actor, the 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), assuming them as actors 
capable of projecting power in world politics. First, we use the 
typology of power in Barnett and Duvall, stated as multifaceted 
and productive of different policies and results. Second, the article 
applied the typology, observing how compulsory, institutional, 
structural and productive powers appear in IGOs action. The 
result was a complex, multilevel and interdisciplinary analysis 
of power phenomenon.
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Resumo
A proteção da internacional da democracia é uma questão de poder. Embora estudos 
recentes sistematizaram a perspectiva multidimensional do poder nas políticas de proteção 
democrática, o foco estava nos Estados nacionais. Este artigo enfocou as Organizações 
Intergovernamentais (OIGs), assumindo-as como atores capazes de projetar poder na 
política mundial. Primeiro, usamos a tipologia do poder em Barnett e Duvall, declarada 
como multifacetada e produtora de diferentes políticas e resultados. Segundo, o artigo 
aplicou essa tipologia observando como os poderes compulsórios, institucionais, estruturais 
e produtivos aparecem na ação das OIGs. O resultado foi uma análise complexa, multinível 
e interdisciplinar do fenômeno político.
Palavras-chave: Poder, Organizações Intergovernamentais, Proteção democrática.
Resumen
La protección de la democracia internacional es una cuestión de poder. Estudios recientes 
han sistematizado la perspectiva multidimensional del poder en las políticas de protección 
democrática con enfoque en los estados nacionales. Este artículo analisa las Organizaciones 
Intergubernamentales (OIG), las entiendo como actores con poder proyectivo en la política 
mundial. Primeiro, utilizamos los tipos de poder de Barnett y Duvall, declarados multifacéticos 
y que producen distintas políticas y resultados. Segundo, analizamos los poderes obligatorios, 
institucionales, estructurales y productivos en la acción de las OIG. El resultado fue un 
análisis complejo, multinivel e interdisciplinario del fenómeno político.
Palabra clave: Poder, Organizaciones intergubernamentales, Protección democrática.
Introduction
In 2016, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) began to carry out a series of 
violations against the European Acquis Communautaire values. These violations 
included the manipulation of constitutional order and substantive actions to 
hinder the court systems’ power of decision-making. In response, the European 
Union (EU) reacted to this situation by mobilizing Article 7 in an attempt to 
change the behavior of the authoritarian domestic elite (Halmai 2018). Similarly, 
in Latin America, the Organization of American States (OAS) used Resolution 
1080 against Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1991) and José Serrano Elias in Guatemala 
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(1993), both self-coup attempts, and applied the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter (IADC) against Honduras’ military division in 2009, also a coup d’état 
attempt (Heine and Weiffen 2015, Shaw 2004, Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, 
McCoy 2012). In all of these contexts, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) 
sought to prevent their State members’ democracies from backsliding.
Indeed, all of the above examples admit the following statement: “The 
promotion of international democracy is concerned with power, in many aspects” 
(Wolff 2015, 219). Seeking democratic compliance worldwide, international 
actors wield power to accomplish their goals. However, to achieve these goals, 
this political action requires an asymmetric relation of power concerning their 
state targets (Wolff 2015). Surprisingly for Wolff, a limited number of scholars 
paid attention to power issues within policies geared toward the promotion 
of democracy, even if a significant part of the foreign affairs discussion was 
in fact dedicated to this matter. Wolff’s article, entitled “Power in Democracy 
Promotion”, insisted on a “systematic consideration of power in the academic 
study of democracy promotion” (Wolff 2015, 220) using the typology of power 
developed by Barnett and Duvall (2005).
Nevertheless, Wolff (2015) focused his analysis on nation-states. From his 
perspective, nation-states present a prevalence over other actors. In his words, 
“International Organizations and nonstate agencies are considered only to be 
instruments of governmental democracy promotion, not as actors in their own 
right” (Wolff 2015, 221). Indeed, most studies about the promotion of international 
democracy have favored activities conducted by individual entities (mainly 
nation-states) and spillover effects associated with contagion structures during 
democratization processes, regardless of actions from other relevant actors 
(Pevehouse 2005).
This article, therefore, proposes a dialog with Wolff’s (2015) proposition. First, 
the same power typology of Barnett and Duvall (2005), divided into compulsory, 
institutional, structural, and productive types, is mobilized. Second and even 
more crucial, this study seeks to apprehend the multifaceted power of multilateral 
promoters in matters of democracy promotion not discussed by Wolff. Precisely, 
this work presents a theoretical and conceptual mobilization regarding the 
power of IGOs in their participation in policies geared toward the promotion of 
democracy.
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This article begins by changing the use of “promotion of democracy” to 
“protection of democracy”, claiming that these concepts are not interchangeable. 
This occurs due to the application of Hawkins’ concept of democracy protection, 
considered to be the “activities that offer tangible or intangible rewards or 
penalties to the state as a whole for aggregate behavior with respect to democratic 
standards” (Hawkins 2008, 375). This concept is particularly useful for the 
multidimensional debate in this article. First, this concept allows the use of 
material and immaterial forms of power, whether through rewards or penalty 
mechanisms. Second, it contemplates the transformations in the actor’s behavior 
toward a democratic standard constructed at the multilateral level. Finally, it 
allows for reflection on the normative construction of a protected democratic 
concept.
Thus, this article is divided as follows. The first section presents the “actorness” 
of IGOs. In this regard, our study discusses the literature regarding how IGOs 
can independently formulate policies according to the Principal-Agent model 
and, mainly, what analytical concerns relate to the construction of democracy 
promotion policies. The second section briefly discusses Barnett and Duvall’s 
(2005) power typology, divided into compulsory, institutional, structural, and 
productive types and features.
Finally, the core of the article demonstrates how these typologies appear 
within IGOs’ idiosyncratic powers. As regards compulsory power, this article 
focuses on: (1) how IGOs use their mechanisms to change behavior, (2) how 
IGOs reach convergence to apply those mechanisms of power, and (3) what is 
at stake when they do that. As regards productive power, this article focuses on: 
(1) the social purpose of IGOs in democracy protection, (2) IGOs as protectors 
of set norms (diffusers); (3) the values and concepts of democracy protection. 
As regards structural power, the discussion treats the role of IGOs’ links and 
governance policies in the export of structural prerequisites that prescribe the 
actor’s behavior and institutional actions to be implemented. Finally, as regards 
institutional power, the discussion treats the IGOs’ use of transnational (TNAs) 
or transgovernmental (TGAs) actors to promote democracy.
The findings in this conceptual-theoretical discussion demonstrated that 
the multifaceted observation of power in the IGOs’ participation in democracy 
promotion policies is complex, multilevel, and interdisciplinary.
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IGOs in rational and social approaches
IGOs are different from nation-states in their own characteristics (Hawkins et 
al. 2006. Thus, the analytical endeavor must assume that this different characteristic 
for IGOs in comparison to nation-states has direct impacts upon the comprehension 
of power in these organizations. This differentiation is directly concerned with the 
connection between Principal-Agents in their forms of delegation and bureaucratic 
culture in decision-making procedures.
In general, IGOs have three main features: as formal institutions, as the 
arena of decision-making, and as actors in world politics (Archer 2001). First, 
IGOs are formally “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors 
that prescribe, denounce, or authorize behavior” (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 
2001, 762). Second, IGOs are organizational structures for decision-making 
processes among nation-states. According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), states 
act through IGOs because they provide depoliticized or specialized forums. 
In many theoretical approaches to international relations (especially within 
regime theory), this formal organizational structure commonly provides an 
optimal arena for negotiations aimed at shaping cooperation, coordination, 
and compliance among nation-states (Keohane 2002; Archer 2001). Third, IGOs 
possess operational and managerial facets that characterize the ‘actorness2’of 
the organization. This results in the IGOs’ capacity to develop an actor-oriented 
or strategic action towards international policies (Hawkins et al., 2006 Brattberg 
and Rhinard, 2013).
Academically, the analysis of IGOs’ capacities divides into two main strands. 
The first approach assumes a rational approach, mainly associated with the 
Principal-Agent (PA) models (Hawkins et al. 2006). This approach focuses on 
delegation factors between different actors for specific tasks. In the context of 
IGOs, Principals are the Member-States, Agents are the international bureaucracies, 
and formalized treaties and pacts are the typical instruments of delegation 
(Hawkins et al. 2006).
For Bauer and Ege (2016), the PA model relates to situations of control by 
Principals and discretion for Agents, summarized in studies of competences/
statutory powers, influences in decision-making, production of sanction policies, 
2 According to Brattberg and Rhinard (2013), in the literature, “actorness” associates with the recognition, 
authority, legitimacy, autonomy, opportunity, presence, capability, and consistency of actions of the IGO in 
world politics. 
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and operational resources in international bureaucracies. In this sense, PA identifies 
the primary explanations for delegation. This delegation is a result of a principal-
agent agreement in the form of a contract (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017).
Indeed, the contract allows for the crucial concept of autonomy. Autonomy 
is considered to be “the range of independent action that is available to an 
agent and can be used to benefit or undermine the principal, while slack is 
actual behavior that is undesired” (Hawkins et al. 2006, 8). For Bauer and Ege 
(2016), autonomy regards the IGOs’ capacity to produce an autonomy of one’s 
will3 and an autonomy to act4. Thus, IGOs can exert their influence in future 
decision-making processes when achieving higher levels of delegation,5 in turn 
diminishing the level of control of nation-states (Hawkins et al. 2006), or when 
IGOs exercise power based on their specialization (Bauer and Ege 2016).
However, the autonomy of the IOs is not a synonym of complete independence 
(Hazelzet 1998). International bureaucracies still respond to nation-states 
(Principals), inserted in a context of control (Hawkins et al. 2006). This control 
occurs through monitoring mechanisms, constraints associated with the content 
of delegation, and the political selection of agents designed to assimilate their 
preferences in consonance with the Principal’s perspective. More importantly, 
the relationship between principal and agent is grounded on mutual benefits, 
which means fewer costs to the Principal in order to achieve a specific outcome 
and higher autonomy for the international bureaucracy to act. Analytically 
speaking, this requires the observation of how nation-states’ decision-making, 
dialogs, and negotiations directly influence the autonomy decision construction 
of IGOs and how a bureaucracy reacts to a state’s decision-making (Haftel and 
Thompson 2006).
The second strand of the agency analysis of IGOs applies a sociological 
perspective, which focuses on the characteristics of bureaucratic actors and their 
social ambience (Bauer and Ege 2016). Indeed, following a Weberian bureaucratic 
theory, the sociological approach opens up the “international institutions’ box” 
3 "Autonomy of will" concerns the capacity of international bureaucracy to establish preferences apart from 
the preferences of the member states. (Bauer and Ege 2016).
4 “Autonomy of action” concerns two types of resources: institutional resources, such as statutory powers, and 
enhancement of administrative resources, to set the agenda. These also persuade states to delegate more 
authority and reduce their level of control (Bauer and Ege 2016; Hawkins et al. 2006). 
5 "Delegation is a conditional grant of authority from a Principal to an Agent, which empowers international 
bureaucracy. This grant is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the Principal. (Hawkins et 
al.2006). 
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searching for conditions for bureaucratic influence and channels of power in 
particular directions. Assuming IGOs are autonomous, the use of sociological 
approaches shed light on the constitutive and constructive form to project actors, 
interests, and social purposes in intra-organizational structures. From Barnett 
and Finnemore’s (1999) perspective, IGOs respond to normative and cultural 
forces that shape how the institution constructs its missions, procedures, and 
concepts. In this sense, ignoring the “social” aspects of organizations requires a 
sensible look into cultural, normative, and identity issues in this endeavor (Hall 
and Taylor 2003). As this article demonstrates, the different power typologies 
mobilize various aspects of this engendering of institutional gears and social 
forces, thus resulting in a complex array of power relations and outputs.
The typologies of power
According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), power “is the production, in and 
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine 
their circumstances and fate (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 8)”. For them, the conceptual 
construction of power has two analytical dimensions: the “kinds of social relations 
through which power works, and the specificity of social relations through which 
effects on actors’ capacities are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9). The 
kinds of power relate to “an attribute of particular actors and their interactions 
or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, 
their social identities and capacities (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9). In relational 
matters, an actor-centered perspective relates to “power over” others, a common 
perspective found in realist approaches. Otherwise, constitutive power relates 
to “power to”, associated with the capacity to produce meaning and structures 
of the domain, typically approached by reflexivist perspectives (Barnett and 
Duvall 2005).
The specificity of power concerns the “degree to which the social relations 
through which power works are direct and socially specific or indirect and socially 
diffuse (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9). This concept is directly related to the fact 
that “specific relations concern the direct causal/constitutive connection between 
actors that are in physical, historical, or social-positional proximity” (Barnett 
and Duvall 2005, 11). Indirect power is mediated by indirect mechanisms (role 
of institutions, whether formal or informal) or produced discourses that shape 
the actor’s subjectivity (Barnett and Duvall 2005).
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Table 1 summarizes the type of power and their general characteristics by 
kind and type.
Table 1 — Types of power and its main characteristics
Type of power General characteristics
Compulsory power
Actor-centered and direct: refers to “relations of the interaction 
of direct control by one actor over another” (Wolff 2015, 221).
Institutional power
Actor-centered and diffuse: which refers to "the control actors 
exercise indirectly over others through diffuse relations of 
interaction” (Wolff 2015, 222).
Structural power
Constitutive and direct: “the constitution of subjects capacities 
indirect structural relation to one another” (Wolff 2015, 222). 
Productive power
Constitutive and diffuse: “the socially diffuse production 
of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification” 
(Wolff 2015, 222).
Source: Compiled from Wolff’s (2015) table and typology content.
The next section will present each type of power exercised by IGOs in 
democracy protection policies, calling attention to their features, including 
the remarkable analytical aspects of each and how they operate in democracy 
protection policies.
Power in place: IGOs and different types of power
Coercive
According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), compulsory power is the direct 
capacity of actors to shape the circumstances or actions of others, intentionally 
or unintentionally. Often, this is the primary type of discussion in international 
relations — typically associated with great power politics, whose studies discuss 
how material resources are used to impose interests in diametric opposition to 
one another (Wolff 2015). Specifically regarding the coercive power of IGOs, the 
literature calls attention to three key aspects: (1) The use of IGO mechanisms 
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to change behavior, (2) the convergence between Principal-Agent to apply 
those mechanisms of power, and (3) what is at stake when IGOs use coercive 
mechanisms.
Predominantly, compulsory power relates to the leverage model of democracy 
promotion. In this model, IGOs encourage countries to behave according to a 
wide range of multilaterally defined institutions. Differently from other types, 
leverage is a top-down approach that focuses on leaders (political elites), and 
central agencies based on the politics of conditionality (Freyburg et al. 2015). 
As a bargaining process, IGOs seek to maximize their utility when the exchange 
of information, threats, promises, and the imposition of sanctions and rewards 
toward a specific behavior deviate from the target. Consequently, this type of 
bargaining process reflects some asymmetry among the actors involved in the 
process (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning 2011).
Hence, the first issue on coercive power relates to IGOs’ different types of 
institutional mechanisms that interfere in different moments of democratization. 
Pevehouse (2002, 2005) dedicated a significant part of his work to analyzing the 
role of IGOs in the democratization process. In his work, IGOs offer three causal 
mechanisms that link their actions to democratization. First, IGOs can apply 
pressure (diplomatic and economic) to compel internal forces toward democratic 
behavior. Second, joining IGOs (membership) can ensure the international 
legitimacy of the elite in transitional contexts. Third, IGOs can produce an 
arena of socialization in which elites can be persuaded to become less averse 
to liberalization and democratization systems, indicating a tendency of learning 
democratic practices at the domestic level.
The second aspect relates to the Principal-Agent relationship within an IGO 
— how IGOs produce convergences when applying coercive mechanisms. This 
means that, for IGOs to act, some cooperation/coordination among member states 
(IGOs as an arena) and international bureaucracies (IGO as an actor) is necessary, 
whether by member-state preferences or through bureaucracy actions by delegation 
(Hawkins et al. 2006). According to Hawkins (2008), the sanctioning of practices 
is not easy to achieve, since member states are resistant to intervention and all 
political costs due to uncertain results. As demonstrated in Table 2, different 
sorts of analytical features come from the type of PA relation, for example: a) the 
range of mechanisms allowed, b) the role of bureaucracy, c) the time for action, 
d) the contents of democratic issues (democratic backsliding/coup d ‘état), and 
e) different types of democracy protection policies and delegation.
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Table 2 — The analytical issues for coercive mechanisms
Issues Features
What is the range of 
mechanisms allowed 
to use?
In this matter, the democratic protection policy demonstrates 
what is at the hands of international bureaucracy to do (Hawkins 
et al. 2006). It involves either material or immaterial tools for 
compliance (Hawkins 2008). 
What is the role of 
bureaucracy?
In this matter, the delegation process sets the institutional 
maneuvers for bureaucratic agents. Some bureaucracies possess 
specialized tools, actions, and performances in democracy 
protection policies. This includes the role of the Secretary-General 
(SG), and specialized offices in different themes and at different 
levels (Chesterman 2007; Hawkins et al. 2006). 
What is the time for 
action?
In this matter, the delegation process demonstrates when IGOs 
would act in cases of democracy protection. For instance, in 
transitions to democracy: after or before the transitional pact. In 
democratic backsliding: after (curative) or before (preventive) 
the coup d'état (Pevehouse 2005). The variance of possibilities 
allows different strategies by international bureaucracies in terms 
of action.
What is the content 
of the democratic 
issue?
Although productive powers also discuss this type of normative 
aspect, in coercive elements, it relates to the legal actions toward 
democratic issues inside the target state (Hawkins et al. 2006). 
This settles a legalistic position about when coercion and what 
types of mechanisms would be allowed.
What is the target of 
coercion?
IGOs have two types of targets: third countries that do not belong 
to the organization or member-states. For both types there are 
different costs and rewards of action. The process of delegation 
enlightens how to act in both cases, how to sustain different 
types of asymmetries, and how to deal in bargaining processes 
(Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004).
Source: Author’s compilation
The third issue relates to what is at stake in leverage policies concerning 
coercion practices. In this sense, coercive power contemplates what mechanisms 
are at the hands of IGOs and how effective they can be. Indeed, effective coercive 
policies depend on the relative bargaining power between IGOs and the target 
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state. Thus, power asymmetry can tell more about how the targets can be a 
subject of conditionality (Buscaneanu 2016). For Buscaneanu (2016), its efficiency 
is mainly contingent on “domestic veto points, cost of adaptation, and the size 
and credibility of rewards or sanctions normative agents can use” (Buscaneanu 
2016, 30). In terms of causality, the more significant the size and credibility of 
conditionality, the higher the chance that this coercive policy will affect the 
cost-benefit curve of the target country.
This credibility also differs regarding the target country. For example, if 
the target country is a member-state, the targeting relates to compliance issues 
between this national state and the organization (Haas 1998). Otherwise, if the 
target is the third country, it is treated as a matter of foreign policy (Smith 2002). 
For each type of target country, belonging or not to the IGOs, some mechanisms 
can be used, with a different range, different P-A coordination, and consequently, 
a different outcome (Schimmelfenning 2007). According to Poppe, Leiniger, and 
Wolff (2019) and Grimm (2019), the mechanism choice also relates to the “opening 
box” of bargaining negotiation between IGOs and target countries. This opening 
box relates to how the content and parameters of negotiation agenda, as well 
as what conditions of this negotiation, might result in a gradual adaptation of 
the promoter’s plan within the context of recipient countries. The protection of 
democracy is rarely the only theme on the agenda, but it is overlapped with the 
economic development agenda, assuming an issue-linkage form of bargaining 
(Poppe, Leiniger and Wolff 2019).
Productive
According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), productive power refers to “the 
constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of 
knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope (Barnett and 
Duvall 2005, 20). In this sense, as a constructivist analytical approach, productive 
power produces systems of meaning resulting from discourse construction that 
produces, fixes, and transforms the processes and systems of knowledge. In 
these discourses, the relation of power can be found in the practices of the 
quotidian, the social fields of actions, and, mainly, the production of social 
identities and capacities according to the socially constructed meaning (Barnett 
and Duvall 2005; Guzzini 2000). Consequently, productive power is a matter 
of subjectivity, as it concerns the social sharing of identity among actors in a 
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co-constituted relationship that produces subjects, meanings, terms of actions, 
and all boundaries of social life (Guzzini 2000).
In matters of democracy protection policies, the perspective appears as a 
normative construction, since it is a social reason provided by collectively shared 
values and norms (Schimmelfenning 2003). In this sense, the analysis regards the 
production of power in the normative prescriptions and a social/political modus 
operandi in terms of decision-making and behavior for a constructed concept 
of democracy (Schimmelfenning 2003). Hence, three main aspects stand out 
regarding productive power in IGOs: (1) What is the social purpose of an IGO in 
democracy protection? (2) What is the phenomenon of an IGO as protectors of 
set norms (diffusers)? (3) What are the values and concepts protected in these 
policies?
IGOs are producers of power because they generate norms and social meanings. 
Thus, IGOs are norm promoters. They “spread norms through establishing 
regimes, forming international agendas, constructing discourse, enforcing rules, 
and mediating between states” (Park 2005,113), and make use of institutional 
prerogatives as gatekeepers to select transnational actors in the global governance 
structure (Tallberg 2010). According to Agné (2014), for instance, when IGOs 
choose a particular concept of democracy, they formulate a given meaning of 
democracy, that which differentiates from another perspective of democracy 
(even those which contradict the selected idea), and, normatively, they determine 
what particular kind of domestic institutional procedure should be protected. 
Consequently, the selection of concepts is a matter of power.
As norm promoters, a crucial subject of study connects to the meaning of 
the multilaterally constructed democratic concept. As Agné (2014) problematised, 
democratic ideals come with several debates inside of IGOs, whether by conflicts 
or convergences, regarding what concept of democracy should be protected 
on an institutional basis. For Whitehead (2015), this political agenda follows a 
particular discourse, an ambitious and intended universal claim, mobilizing both 
institutional and ideational reinforcement. In his argument, the conceptualization 
of democracy involved a strong ideology,6 which influenced the public policy 
agenda for years, but now faces resistance from “democracy prevention” or 
“anti-democracy promotion”. According to Wetzel, Orbie and Bossuyt (2015), the 
6 A strong ideology has four features: “(1) tight fusion of fact and value; (2) selective reinterpretation of the 
past; (3) marginalization and suppression of alternative viewpoints; and (4) airbrushing inconsistencies to 
hold together multiple constituencies” (Whitehead 2015, 14).
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substance of this ideology generally followed a “Western model”14 of democracy 
or promoting polyarchy (Whitehead 2015), and, paradoxically, some skepticism 
about the sustainability of this model is always debatable.
Recent literature sharply opposes the argument of the EU’s coherent concept 
of democracy. According to Kurki (2015), the organizational complexity of the EU 
does not lead to a “consistent and coherent” approach on democratic matters, 
although, discursively, the EU extols these democratic qualities. Instead, the 
EU’s form of democracy promotion works with a broad but vague definition 
of democracy, mobilizing values, such as — liberty, equality, solidarity — but 
without a systematic model of democracy promotion.
First, the complexity of the EU denies the possibility of a singular and definitive 
idea of democracy. The historical pluralism in the EU, with different experiences 
and institutions, guides the process of conceptual vagueness (Kurki 2015). Second, 
in her findings, the EU promotes democracy in terms of a “depoliticized” manner, 
a “technocratic, rules-export, governance focus” (Young and Pischchikova in 
Wetzel 2015, 3) or strategies that display “a technocratic orientation and are 
instrumental to deepening market-based reform in aid receiving countries” (Hout 
in Wetzel 2015, 3). Third, the common ground of democracy in the EU follows 
a more liberal model, but not a pure liberal model, as it is also connected to 
economic conditions in favor of successful democratization (Kurki 2015).
The result is the promotion of a fuzzy liberal democracy within the EU context. 
This fuzziness is not accidental or coincidental; instead, it favors a political-
economic model to export democracy. First, it serves to create an economic 
restructuring of states; in other words, a robust normative approach of what 
to do with political institutions in conjunction with economic policies. Second, 
a broad and fuzzy agenda allows contradictions in agenda-setting policies. 
It is particularly interesting for international bureaucracies for two reasons: 
a more significant maneuver margin for action and a discourse of “depoliticizing” 
democratic argument by technocratic discourse.7 In this sense, this unique, fuzzy 
liberalism works well when normative ideals are apparently put in second place 
when faced with pragmatic interested-oriented cooperation, and when it puts 
closure upon an ideological dispute taken up by target states confronting an 
unclear ideological position regarding the concept of democracy (Kurki 2015).
7 From Kurki's (2011) perspective, technocratic discourses are "conceptual frameworks that seek to 'depoliticize, 
'harmonize,' 'rationalize' and 'objectify' the democracy promotion policy agenda and knowledge-making and 
management within it" (Kurki 2011, 212). 
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Thus, some consequences appear when contemplating the construction of 
the concept of democracy. First, although the normative basis on the discourse 
does exist, there is a tendency to avoid value-based rhetoric, giving space to 
interest-based and instrumental arguments. The discourse of rationality and 
coherence of policy-making overlaps the provision of normative justifications 
in the process of formulating a democracy promotion policy. Second, coherent 
reasoning can be given to the process in association with an incoherent 
concept of democracy, which gives rise to a technocratic discourse. The result 
is the presence of normative and political issues that are in fact denied by the 
procedure. Third, the rational coherent discourse assumes any contesting and 
debating of democracy’s meaning as hazardous (Kurki 2015). It means that 
when discussions regarding “which democracy” or “whose democracy” appear, 
they are instantly treated as dangerous or skeptically implemented. Fourth, 
productive power favors some actors over others, especially when some biases 
in the discourse occur; some liberal organization, types of NGOs, technical 
personnel and offices, and some member states as leaders are preferred over others 
(Kurki 2015).
Finally, the political dynamic does not favor new discussions regarding the 
concept of democracy, considering that the focus on the concept of democracy is a 
minimalist version at best. As demonstrated, ideals of “democracy” are crucial to 
democracy protection policies. In Kurki’s view, the definition of liberal democracy 
does not capture all aspects of the political process, and alternative models — 
such as social democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and 
radical democracy — must be discussed in parallel with the embedded democracy 
assumption. Thus, “there are important reasons — theoretical, normative, 
political, and practical — to take the essential contestability of the idea of 
democracy in democracy promotion, for both scholars and practitioners, seriously” 
(Kurki 2010, 376).
Structural
According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), structural power consists of the 
co-constitutive structure, which defines what social actors are. It denotes that 
structural power exists because of an internal relation between a structural 
position A in relationship with a structural position B. Thus, the consequences 
of the co-constitutive connection between A and B shapes the actors not only by 
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the structural inequalities in capacity allocation, but also because of the different 
meanings in a subjective interaction between those actors.
Specifically, for democracy protection policies implemented by IGOs, structural 
power appears in linkages and governance policies (Freyburg et al. 2015). In 
both cases, those policies export structural prerequisites and forms of behavior 
production with a concept of democracy: a prescription of actor’s behavior and 
institutional aspects to be implemented in a target country. More traditionally, 
one of the first structural powers by IGOs was the linkage model of democracy 
promotion. The linkage model associates democratization through some structural 
prerequisites (Lipset 1959), whether by socioeconomic development or transnational 
exchange (Freyburg et al. 2015). Thus, this perspective of democracy promotion 
produces some substantive consequences in IGO actions.
First, linkage policies prepare the political scenario for a democratic culture 
in a society. This democratic culture comes from several strategies of action: 
economic aid (credits, assistances, and investments), intergovernmental negotiation 
(bilateral and multilateral), promotion of societal interaction, actions of international 
technocracy, communication and networks (Western media penetration, internet 
connection, for example), adoption of development policies, educational policies, 
strengthening of civil society associations, and the organization of the public 
sphere (Freyburg et al. 2015; Sasse 2013).
Second, instead of focusing on specific preferences of governmental or 
nongovernmental actors, linkage policies aim to transform long-term calculations 
by changing socioeconomic structures, associating high levels of economic 
development with the quality of democratization. Third, the focus remains on 
bottom-up factors of democratization and not top-down, as seen in political 
conditionality by means of leverage. Indeed, linkage strategies assume that 
changing socioeconomic structures also change the dispersion of power in society. 
Following an indirect strategy, linkage promotion seeks a profound economic 
transformation, a long-term horizon of change, but with substantive analytical 
implications due to the difficult access of empirical verification (Lavenex 2013).
Linkage strategies assume some necessary conditionality for successful 
policies. First, some autonomy by the civil society in the third country enhances 
transnational openness. In Freyburg et al. (2015), “Linkage efforts will not reach 
civil society if a country is isolated from the outside world. Moreover, civil 
society has no freedom to maneuver” (Freyburg et al., 2015, 17). Thus, less 
accessibility on the part of the third country means less effectiveness in linkage 
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strategies. For Sasse (2013), successful linkage policies require the expertise of 
some domestic actors in order to select, pragmatically, some of these policies. 
Generally, third countries with different degrees of ‘stateness’8 can produce different 
outcomes, since they have different levels of domestic political competition. In 
the author’s argument, international linkages can strengthen and weaken this 
domestic competition, encouraging or suppressing regime openings because of 
the role of these actors in an asymmetric structure.
The democratic governance model follows some similarities and differences 
from the traditional strategy of linkage. Much like linkage strategies, the governance 
model strengthens domestic forces in society but focuses on sectoral cooperation 
arrangements in public administration (Lavenex, 2013). The structural power in 
the governance model resides in the capacity to (1) introduce reforms on public 
administration through policy transfer to change the practices in the conduction 
of public policy. This means that, differently from linkage policies, the governance 
model focuses on legal administrative grounds; (2) cooperation relates to legislation 
transference, or, beyond policy transformation, governance model transfers 
polity structures associated with democracy standards; (3) much like linkage 
policies, the effectiveness assumes some openness and autonomy of domestic 
administration, that is, “a certain degree of decentralization of administrative 
structures, empowerment of administrative officials, and openness toward contacts 
and cooperation with the administrations of international organizations and 
other countries” (Lavenex, 2013,143-144).
Institutional power
According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), institutional power is the capacity of 
the actor’s control of others in indirect ways. This is indirect because actor A uses 
formal and informal institutions to guide, constrain, and propose conditions and 
actions of others. Another crucial aspect of institutional power is that, spatially, 
this type affects others’ behavior only through institutional arrangements, and 
temporally, “institutions established at one point in time can have ongoing and 
unintended effects at a later point” (Barnett and Duvall 2005,16).
It is interesting to note that the IGOs’ institutional power reflects the use 
of organizations by other organizations. In this particular context, IGOs use 
8 According to Sasse (2013), ‘stateness’ is defined as “tensions arising from the incongruence between the state 
and the nation (ops cit, 2013, 554). 
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transnational actors (TNAs) or transgovernmental actors (TGAs) to promote 
democratic policies. First, IGOs have the power to select, encourage, and limit 
some aspects of institutional and informational access and budgetary issues. 
Second, by its constitutions, transnational/transgovernmental organizations 
have independence in action, which leads to cooperative delegations (Tallberg 
2010). Thus, the institutional power of IGOs in democracy protection involves, 
first, the authority in selecting TNAs/TGAs; second, power in IGO-TNA/TGA 
interaction; third, the use of TNA/TGAs in democracy protection (Tallberg 2010).
TNAs are “both non-profit actors, such as NGOs, advocacy networks, social 
movements, party associations, philanthropic foundations, and labor unions 
(sometimes referred to as civil society actors), and profit-oriented actors, such 
as multinational corporations and business associations” (Tallberg and Jonsson 
2010, 4). In a context of an accusation of “democratic deficit” against IGOs, 
TNAs have taken on the role as a supplement for the improvement of democratic 
decision-making procedures and a new means through which to achieve adequate 
problem-solving capacity in policy formation (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010). On 
that account, TNAs have witnessed gradual participation in new modes of 
governance, especially in those involving public and private actors (Tallberg and 
Jonsson 2010). Over time, TNAs have taken part in a different moment of the 
policy cycle, mobilized between representation for collaboration and access to 
those policies, considered to be “policy experts, service providers, and compliance 
watchdogs” (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010, 45).
According to Tallberg (2010), some reasons allow the access of TNAs within 
IGOs. The first is the functional efficiency of TNAs. The selection of TNAs occurs 
because of their technical capacity to achieve precise results in matters that IGOs 
are unable to resolve. This process of delegation can vary according to the needs 
of international organizations. The second reason is democratic legitimacy. As 
discussed before, IGOs were heavily pressured at the beginning of the 1990s 
due to several accusations regarding democratic deficits in their decision-making 
procedures. In this sense, TNAs do not only act in favor of democracy promotion 
as a system of government, but also as improvers of democratic legitimacy 
within the IGOs, since global civil society can access procedures, decisions, and 
consultations (Tallberg 2010). Finally, the greatest importance of institutional 
power: IGOs and states can exploit TNAs to gain leverage inside IGOs, as both 
an actor and an arena, respectively. Differently from IGOs, States use TNAs to 
gain additional advantage within IGOs, supporting actors according to their 
political positions (Tallberg 2010).
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IGOs, on the other hand, can use TNAs in two ways. First, IGOs aims to 
improve their policies’ efficiency, thus maneuvering different actors according 
to their like-minded practices. IGOs control the presence of TNAS in a policy 
cycle, focusing on programmatic activities in the field, as service providers or 
enforcement mechanisms of IGOs in some issue-areas, but not in decision-making 
stages (or agenda-setting phases) (Tallberg 2010). According to Tallberg (2010), 
these interactions between stages would achieve an optimal result from both 
actors, as IGOs would propose an issue in the agenda-setting stage and TNAs 
could participate through independent maneuvers and the implementation of 
these issues.
Second, IGOs can control access to these TNAs in the organization. IGOs 
can discriminate TNAs ex-ante, according to their mechanisms of selection. It is 
a powerful institutional mechanism, because TNAs, to obtain access, must adapt 
to perspectives and procedures of the contractor IGOs (Tallberg 2010). According 
to Mahoney and Beckstrand (2011), in the case of the EU, the Commission has 
funded pro-EU TNAs in matters of democracy, cultural exchange, educational 
projects, and integrative policies. grounding the argument that the institutional 
power appeared in the selection and funding of TNAs. This level of asymmetry 
interferes directly in which process of the policy cycle TNAs will work and what 
type of TNAs will be allowed: who and when. According to Tallberg (2010), the 
dynamics of power would result in three concerns: “support for like-minded 
actors, opposition to antagonistic actors, and reinforcement of existing power 
structures” (Tallberg 2010, 57).
According to Johnson (2016), because of the differences in displays of 
power, the interaction between IGOs and transnational actors can achieve four 
possibilities: cooperation, co-optation, competition, and conflict. In the authors’ 
point of view, two causes lead the IGO-TNA interaction to these different paths: 
(1) a shared array of values concerning cross-national layering and (2) distinct 
resource bases. In the absence of one or two of these factors, co-optation, 
competition, or conflict occur.
The IGO-TNA interaction contributes to other power relations. First, although 
asymmetric, NGOs are not always adversaries, but rather tamed partners. In 
this relation, ideational and material factors appear in a supply and demand 
relationship. On one hand, the ideational factor is a dialog between what fits 
in an IGO’s international bureaucracy intentions and what TNAs offer to it. On 
the other hand, a material factor relates to physical factors. TNAs search for 
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resources, which the IGOs have. It is through this combination of supply and 
demand that a relationship of interdependence arise, but in an asymmetric form. 
The asymmetry mainly appears in an IGO’s power as a gatekeeper agenda-setter 
in policy-making circles, and TNAs as service providers in policy implementation 
(Johsson 2016).
TGAs are “sub-units of governments”. A transgovernmental (TG) cooperation 
relates “to a cross-border peer-to-peer partnership between public institutions 
in specific policy sectors in pursuit of policy coordination, coalition building, 
and other functional goals” (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie 2017, 1). The use of 
TGAs by IGOs is generally associated with the governance model of democracy 
promotion. In fact, they use TGAs to change public administration rules and 
frameworks towards “good governance” policies (Panchuk, Bossuyt and 
Orbie 2017).
The type of institutional power in cases of TGAs relates to the “sectoral 
conditionality”, in which the IGOs can possess greater bargaining power over 
some countries, including some democratic governance norms and policies in 
their particular governmental sectors (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie 2017). In this 
sense, the IGO´s control relates to the selection and capacity provision of TG 
cooperation works as a democratic governance promoter. Another aspect is the 
sector politicization, or the susceptibility of the sector of conflict of interest or 
corruption, which has some influence on the quality of democracy promotion. 
In this sense, TG cooperation relates to the IGO’s sectoral conditionality in 
the particular policy sector (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie 2017). Differently of 
NGOs, TG cooperation gives more importance to domestic factors in matters 
of organizational capacity, the politicization of internal bureaucracy, and the 
leverages of the IGOs in the incentives to produce democratic norms. Empirically, 
as demonstrated by Panchuk Panchuk, Bossuyt, and Orbie (2017), the use of 
TGAs varies according to “political liberalization, sector politicization, sector 
technical complexity, and EU sectoral conditionality” (Panchuk, Bossuyt and 
Orbie 2017, 5).
Therefore, as a means to summarize this information, Table 3 presents the 
dimensions mobilized in this article: a) the types of power; b) the application to 
the state-centric promotion; c) the IGOs discussed in this article; d) the models 
of democracy promotion associated with their types.
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Table 3 — Typologies of power in a comparative perspective: State-centric vs IGOs
Type of 
power









“Concerns the capacity of 
democracy promoters to directly 
shape the behavior of (actors in) 
recipient countries”  
(Wolff 2015, 222)
Concerns the capacity 
of the direct use of 
institutional mechanisms 
(both rewards or 
punishments) in 
different moments of 
democratization. These 
institutional mechanisms 
serve as political 
conditionality based on 
compliance responses and 
in an asymmetric relation 





“Concerns the capacity to 
indirectly influence recipient 
behavior through a democracy 
promoter’s impact on 
international institutions and 
nongovernmental organizations” 
(Wolff 2015, 222)
Concerns the indirect 
use of TNA/TGAs 





“Concerns the capacity to 
directly shape the structure of 
relations between democracy 
promoter and recipient, as well 
as the structural conditions 
in recipient countries through 
interaction with (actors in) 
recipient countries”  
(Wolff 2015, 222)
Concerns the capacity 




changes (economic and 







“Concerns the capacity to 
indirectly shape the structure 
of bilateral relations and the 
structural conditions in recipient 
countries through effects on 
general systems of knowledge 
and discursive practices”  
(Wolff, 2015, 222).
Concerns the constitutive 
capacity of bureaucracies 
to a) construct a 
normative concept, 
meaning, and identity 
of democracy b) project 
this concept as promoter/
protector of set norms
Governance 
and Linkage
Source: Authors’ compilation in dialog with Wolff (2015) and Freyburg et al. (2015).
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Conclusion
As discussed in this article, the international promotion of democracy is a 
matter of power. In this regard, the current literature paid little attention to the 
multifaceted feature of this power, especially as regards the role of the nation-
state (Wolff 2015). Specifically, this article called attention to the literature gap 
concerning the role of IGOs in this multifaceted power found in the promotion of 
democracy. Some crucial insights have also arisen for further analysis. First, the 
analytical decision for the role of IGOs called for understanding the differences 
between these organizations and nation-states.
Indeed, as demonstrated, this differentiation is not trivial. First, the use 
of power in democracy protection requires the understanding of international 
bureaucracies. As sources of IGOs’ actorness, international bureaucracies seem 
to be the core of instrumental, substantive, and normative action of IGOs in 
world politics. Second, in association with the role of bureaucracies (actors), the 
analysis of the interaction with the arena of negotiation (nation-states) can be 
loose. In other words, although the international bureaucracies can trace some 
independence, nation-states still have a place in the democracy protection policies 
in IGOs. Third, the understanding of power by IGOs in democracy protection need 
to answer three essential questions: a) What is the substance (normative) of the 
concept of democracy protection?; b) What type of institutions are protected, 
expanded, promoted?; c) What institutional mechanisms and organizations are 
used for this end? Indeed, the theoretical-conceptual debate of IGOs in democracy 
protection open a range of analysis, not only to understand the types of power 
in place, but also how they interact toward democracy expansion. This opens 
an interdisciplinary approach and an empirical mobilization that is not trivial, 
but rather requires attentive eyes of those who delve into it.
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